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FILE
~PEECJ.I

IN THE

0:::' SENATOR MIK8 1-.r.ANS'FIELD
AUGUST
1c 54

S~NATE

AFTER GENE
AMERICAN POLICY--GERMANY AND

1-/ r. President: Throughout !he spring and summer the problem of
Indochina has come periodically to the attention of the Senate. It has been, perhaps, the most important question offorcign policy to arise during the 83rd
Congress.

From time to time I have had occasion to mc..ke observations on the

subject here on the floor of the Senate.

.More often I have listened to others and

enriched my understanding of the is sues invol ;ed.

•

The conflict in Ir..dochina has been stilled by the armistice recently
negotiated in Gene va.
months.

This conflict is not likely to erupt again in the next few

Not· is there much liklihood that

diploma~ic

activity now in progress

looking to the defense of Southeast Asia will lead to fruitful results in the immediate future.
The tide of international affairs is flowing on in the aftermath of
Gene va, to new crests elsewhere on the globe .

I would like, therefore, to address

myself to the situation in two other areas, areas which in the next few months
may become keys of decision in the struggle to turr.
communism.

back the drive of totalitarian

These areas are Germany and Japan.

Before doing so, however, if the Senate will bear with me for a few
moments, there are some mattet·s of conscience which I should like to set forth.
In the heat of debate on the Indochina issue, some of us may have slipped

--2-momc:nt arily into p- rtis:>n a hip.
of

Indochin ~

problem~

F or the most P""r t, however. these discussions

h- •e represented a se?rching for

~n

honest understanding of the

which beset us in Southe::-st ..Asi- ,nd their rel?tionehip to our polici cs

throughout the world .

They h;:-·.re been -n ... ttempt to find <-nswers , the best

-ns,·; ers for the United St-:>tes---not

?S

Republicans or Democr ts---but

""S

Americ~ns .

Th-t, m my opinion, is

?

s it should be.

While there is no constitu -

ti on-1 obli g?t ion to compel the m;> jotity .,.nd minority to coopet·;-te on foreign
policy

I thin'< that the preser 'ation of the n-:tion urgently requires us to work

together with respect to these vital m o.ttn-s·.
I d

n - t mean •that we should agree simply for

even when conscience compels us to disagree .

t~e sal~e

of agreement ,

I do say , however, that we should

r efr ain from seeking par tisan advantage out of the misfortunes which the entire
nation sustains when our foreign policy misfires ,
Some sought precisely that type of advantage , perhaps unwittingly, in
the fall of China Lo the Communists several years ago .

They may have gained,

temporarily, frvm this course but the nati•.>n as a whole is still paying for their
thoughtless political profit .

I hope that others will not follow this example , and

seek similar gain out of the collapse of policy in I ndochina .

The temptation to

take an eye fo r an eye in this situation is great but it should be resisted .
Both this Administraticn and its predecessor have made important
mistakes in foreign policy.

There is no perfection in the conduct of foreign

affairs anymore than in any othe r human activity .

Nor has either party a monopoly

-- 3 -on the sincere devotion t o

th~

welfare of the country and the wisdom which alone

can guaranty that the policies we pursue as a nation will be the best possible
p olicies .

It is one of the functions of debate in the Senate to bring mistakes

which may be made to light and, as far as possible, to pointthe way to the ir cor r ection . At the sa me time, however, it is in the interests of the nation to
r ecognize that both administrations --one Democratic , one Republican --have done
their best to grapple with the present threat to us all from abroad, the threat
of international communism.
It is against this threat which we must direct our common effort

if we are to survive and prosper as a free nation.

If we dissipate our strength

in petty internal dissent and fruitless name - calling we shall have little left for
deployment agains t the real enemy .
One of the basic aims of the Soviet Union is to divide us among ourselves.

Without realizing it, many of our own people have in effect supported

this aim .

They have spoken and acted in a manner which tends to bring about an

irr eparahle cleavage between the two great political parties over issues of foreign
policy.

Such statements and actions, if continued, can only lead to the weakening

and the ultimate ruin of the nation.
The way to avoid this catastrophe has been shown by the bi - partisan
manner in which the able and distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Wiley)
haa served as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the cooperation
he has received in this respect from the able and distinguished Senator from
Georgia (Mr. George).

It has also been i lluminated by the remarks of the

--4 - -

diotint;uishcd majority leader (Mr. l<nowland) and the distinguished minority
leader (Mr . Johnson of Tex<s).

The majority leader, several weeks ago, stated

that
"Neither of our great p0litical parties has a
monopo ly on patriotism ... Ltt us, he!'e and no·.v,
Republicans and Democrats alike, rccogn~ zc
that there ir: only ont- group th~t can pr per'y
be charged with being 'the party of treason'
and that is the Communist Party and the undergr0und conspirators . "
The minority leader, answering for those on this side of the aish',
replied by saying
'''"e arc r eady to meet the President and the
Administration half way . As responsible men ,
we arc ready at any time to cooperate in the
pr('Servati<.n of our country. 11
Theae two statements contain principles nf responsible leadership
which set the nation's interest above the transitory interests of either party.
If they prevail, the nation will be safe regardless of the perils which may beset

us abroad .

I trust that the integrity of these principles will be maintained in the

pJlitical campttign of 1954 as they were not, unfortunately, in the pcliUcal campaign of 1952.
It would be helpful if these principles were also reflected in Con gressional attitudes towards the Secretary of State .

Secretaries of State,

traditionally, are not expected to be popular, except in histc rical pe rsp<>ctivc.
Nor have they, I regret to say, as a rule, violated this tradition.
It is time to recognize , however, that they have made significant

contributions to the welfare and security of the nation.

ll is time to stop making

--5-a whipping 'ooy out of the incu:nbent of thh; office,

whoever he may be , and to

recognize that his jub is and will always be diLficult at best.

It is time to

recognize that the men who have occupied the offici.! in recent years, whether
Rcpubli.can or Dc•nocrat, without exception. havt.. striven with deep devotion to
thd r

rht~ieJ

tu safeguard this nation, within the li."l"lits of their capacity and their

su1)port.
There is a legitimate scope for criticism of the Secretary of State .
There is nothing sacrosanct in that office auymorc than in any other in the govern ment.

But if the criticism of the Secretary stems from the search for a scape -

goat, if it stems from destructive partisan purpose, then it would be better for the
nation if it r emained unexpressed .

Growing out of motivations sttch as these ,

criticism can 011ly serve to reduce the Secretary to in pot<'n<ey in the conduct of his
office.

It will tic his hands at a time when all his skills must be mobilized if he

i s to deal effectively with the t r eachery , the force and the trickery of the
comMunist enemy .
'Y!ith these thoughts -- these bi - partisan thoughts -- in mind, I should
like to proceed n')W to a conside r ation of certain aspects of the inte r national
situation which are beginning to rise to the surface in the
ference.

wal~c

of the Geneva Con -

For the first time in many years , the guns are silent on every major

front in the world.

This unusual quiet docs not signify genuine peace .

Fhile it

l asts , what we have is a period of shaky and uncertain co - e-<istcnce .
Some may dislike the term

1

co - existence '.

Some may prefer the word

--6-'tru<"-.. ', or the phrase 'war withuut guns'.

Whatever the preference in idiom,

however, the fact is thal we are either engaged in war in which Americans and
others in conaiderable numbers are being killed and maimed or we arc in a p 11ase
of non-war or cold war or so-called co-existence.
The danuer in using the worl d co-existence to describe the present
stale of world affairs is that the co-existence may be illusory.

It may be simply

the lull before the storm which gives a false sense of security to some and a
sense of oppressive uneasiness to others .
Co-existence in a world stalked by totalitiarn communism is indeed
illusory unless it is based on t:1e utmost vigilance on our part, unless it is
supported by a l evel of strength among the free nations that discourages aggressior
and the threat of aggression.
The strength to which I refer is not lo be measured solely in terms of
atomic and conventional military hardware on hand and ready for use.

This is an

impo rtant element, but strength is also compounded of many other factors .

It

includes the moral fiber of a people, or to put it another way, their staying power;
it includes the diplomatic capacity to win and maintain the willing and active

cooperation of other nations and the neutrality of still o.thcrs; it includes strategic
considerations; it includes economic health and vitality.
Strength in an international sense is also a r elative term.

It is,

today, the total strength- - moral, diplomatic, military , strategic and economic-of the nations linked together freely in the cause of freedom as against that of the
communist bloc, marshalled under the command of Moscow.

A relative gain in

--7--

a ny '"l ! these fa c to r s on o u r p art mean s a rela tive weak ening of the to tal strength
of international communism.

Any r elative gain on their part, in any category,

si m ila rly m eans a we akening of o ur p o sition.
F') r s o me time now, it seems to me that the relative strength of the
Commun ist Ll o c h as been increasing in several of the categories to which I have
r cJ.c rr e d.

In m ilitary preparedness, we have been cutting back and reducing

our a rmy, navy and marine corps; the Communists have been increasing theirs.
Acco rding to a recent newspaper column, the communist camp now c0ntains
approximately 430 infantry divisions.

On our side, I understand that in addition

to our 17 army and 3 marin e corps divisions, there are approximately 100 allied

1

divisions extending fr o m No rway thro ugh Turkey .
divisions are available in the Far East.

Perhaps another 40 or 50

The communists already possess for mid-

able air power and it is increasing; they are pushing a vast naval building
pr o gram .

Their arsenal of atomic and hydrogen weapons is expanding rapidly

as is their research in scientific developments along these lines .
To a great extent, this growth in Communist military power is based
on the rapid development of industrialization, not only in Russia but in the
satellites of the So viet bloc.

So great has been this development that the com -

munists are now beginning to mov0 into international markets in conside r able
force.

Newspaper repo rts indicate that envoys from Moscow and Peking have

made their appearances in capitals

as far apart as Buenos Aires and Singapore ,

Oslo and Canberra, s e eking wool, chemicals, steel, rubber, machinery and
consumer goods.
capitals.

Similarly, many trade m issions are visiting

the communist

--8 - The gre atest

po t~ 1 .tial

!or a gro wth in the relative strength o! the

communists, however, seems to me to be found in the diplomatic field.

In

pr:1 c tically every major a rea of the world, they arc on the diplo m atic offem::ive.
This is especially true in Europe and Asia.

Molo tov is

agai~

pres s ing fer a

conr-ideration of a security pact in Europe, and now, after Geneva, his pro po sal
may J'ecdve a different reception than similar proposals have obtained in the
past.
On the other end of the Moscow - Peking a>·is , Chou En-lai is
attempting to charm the countries of Asia into similar so-called security arrangements aimed at the United States .

In view of India's progressive estrangement

tro.n this country in recent months, the activities of the Chinese Communist
foreiGn mmister contain implications of the most serious nature .
There arc great stakes involved in the diplomatic struggle that is now
in progress.

Here it is not a matter of a few resources, a few strategic positions

and a reluctant people being seized by the Communists and dragged into their
camp .

In this diplomatic struggle , the wilti ng allegiance or the benevolent

neutrality of entire nations is involved .
The Communists are striving , by a combination of diplomacy and
econor..1ic enticements , to drive the free nations furthe1· and .further apart and
to draw as many of them as possible into their orbit or into an intermediate
s tage of neutralism .

The greater their success in this drive, the more

inadequate our relative strength becomes, and the m o re illusory the shaky co exbtence that rests upon it.

--9-If this drive g0c s u,1checkcd by the counter-forces of freedom, then it

seems to me that one of two possible results may be expected.

P. third world war

will tal..c place at s ome time in the not too distant future when the illusion of c o existence dissolves; or the world will witness the gradua.l surrender without
stt·n £,t;l .:! of <'1os t o.l the free nations to totalitarianism.
It is a grim prospect which confronts us and because it is so grim, I
want to call to the attention of the Senate, the situation in two areas in which I
believe a decisive test of the Soviet diplo matic drive will come.

I refPr to the

countries of Germany and Japan.
These two nations possess p o werful sinews of strength of the kind I
have previously described .
enor mo us military p o tential.

Vast, literate and capable populations give them an
Advanced industrial establishments supply them

with great econo m ic and scientific power .

Situated, as they are, on the western

and e astern fringes of the sprawling communist empire, they have incalculable
strategic importance.
Western G 0rmany and Japan are preuently linked to the free nations
by tics which evo lved o ut of the military occupations following World V.'ar II.
In the case of Germany, these are still ties of inequality; in the case of Japan,
they are tics between sovereign equals.

In both caoes , however, situations have

developed which c o uld bring about a severance of the ties and thrust Germany and
Japan into neutral positions or even into close relationships with the communist
powers.

--1 0 --

These developments have not come about suddenly , although they
appear now to be approaching a climax with great rapi:lity- -especially in Germany.
P. s long ago as 1949, however, they were beginning to become evident.

I visited

Germany in that year and reported to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on my
return as fellows:
V'est Germany, in spite of the difficulties it has faced in
the postwar years, is en the way up .. . Although Germany
is at the present time in a very weak position with two
separate governments ••• it is potentially the strongest
nation in \·'estern Europe .. . Germany is, in r.-1y opinion,
the big prize which the U. 3 . S. R. now wants and, if necessary,
she can ana perhaps will offe r the Germans some cf the
lands which have been taken away from them and are now
occupied by Czechoslova~da and Fo land . This, plus the
creation of a Russian - dominated East German army, plus
the H.ussian championship of a united Ger:nany- on Russian
ter ms - poses a difficult problem for the West .
That was the situation five years ago.
exists today.

The same situation, intensified,

It is intensified, I believe primarily because of a possible change

in Soviet tactics with respect to Ger many.

The Russians may now be en the verge

of offering important c oncessions , economic and political, to the Ger mans .
may be prepared to do so on the basis of cne or two principal conditions:

They

(l) that

the Germans abandon their plans for participating in the integration of the defense
of Western Europe; and (2) that the military forces of East Germany, Russiantrained and equipped, be inco rpo rated into the defense structure of a united

~eich.

In connection with this latter condition, the role of Forrne r Field Marshall
Friedrich von Paulus will bear watching.

He is the General who surrendered at

Stalingrad and subsequently was director of the schools established in Russia to

- -11 reindoctrinatc German war prisoners.

If the Russians intend to act along these lines , then the appeal of
national unity may well prove irresistibl<.: to the German people; it may lead
th--:.-:n, i 1 present drcumstances, away from the V'est.
Under Chancellor Konrad Adtmauer, \"!estern Germany has accepted
the cource of we:.;tcrn European integration first and national unity l ater ,

The

Germans have accepted this course ia preference tv one of national unity . Sovi et style, and absorption into the Communist bloc at the same time ,
however, that Ger many may be faltering .

There are s i gns .

Recent l ocal elections suggest a

growing strength on the part of those political parties which favor immediate
uniiication, parties which believe they can maintain a kind of German neutralism
by restoring relations with Moscow and b y returning to the pre-war Locarno treaty
system.

Two pre - \..Jar German chancellors , Dr . Heirrich Bruening and Dr. Hans

Luther, have now openly aligned themselves against Adenauer ' s policies and in
favor of this :nislcading alternative .
security chief of

\lcst~rn

German y , may also be indicative of deep and

disturbing political currents,
this juncture nay

b~

The recent defection of Dr, Otto John, the

Significant concessions from the Soviet Union at

enough to swing the Gerr.,..1ans away from the V!est.

Thc1·e are dangerous trends in Germany today.

In my view, they

have developed because of the inter'ninable delays in restoring full sovereignty
tv V'es tern Germany and in

esta~>l

ishing the European

Def~nse

Community.

E. D. C . promised, at one time, to cap the m.>ve.nent towards western European
unity which began in the early postwar years.

E . D. C. offered both assurances

- - 12--

against the return of German militarism and security for
cxp::mding commanisl cr.1pirc-.
part:cipation, as an

~qu:~l

German~

against the

It also p:::-omised to ;'.a:oviac an avenue fur German

in the defense of the west, oo ti:at our . hare in that de-

fcr.se mig:1t be loduccd.
Mon.b& C\nd

y~c:1·~

have elapsed since French ceniu., t-'l'oduccd E. D. C .

But E. D. C. stHl waitf: on Fr<.r.cl: :lccer>tancc .

it.t:q•l'llily.

The burden of its

dcfcns~

1'1

continu..:s

~o

th~

mca:-1\.iTP" the hope for inte-

fall un tl11.: occ:.!;>ation forces of

t!lC Tjnitcd !:;tales, Britain and France .

The Germans are not

li 1.~ely

present unc,.rtain and inferior status .
the war and now
Western Europe .

hav~

to acquiesce for 1nuch longer in their
They have made a fantastic recovery from

the most powerful andd) namic economy on the mainland of

They are in a position to lbten to and to bargain with the East.

After returning frorn Europe in 1951, I

rcp~1rted

to lhe ForeiGn Affairs

Committee of the House of Representatives that:
In any defense plan for Western Europe , Hnsl Germany
must be an integral and substantial part. '''e must
meel lhe West Ge r mans at the council table and d~cide
what part they will ac~cpt a..; their share in me:1, money,
and equipment in the defense of Western Europe . • . (The
Germans) should be allowed to rearm in their own defense
and we should recognize Vl est Germany as an <'qual.
That was , in my view, the need tlr oc and a half years ago.
even more u r gent need now .

It is an

Senate Resolution 295 which passed by a vote of 88

to 0 just a few days ago indicates the sentiment of this body with respect to restoring equality to G<.>rmany and securinG their participation in the joint deicnse of the

--13-· free nations of the V' est.

I believe the Administration should act quic1::.ly, in

every pra.-:ticat-te wa·/. \:o c ! vc me::1.ninp, to thin

el"d of t1ds motith if E. D.C. is not
th3 Frc;1ch Par}

~o.rr e~t

by Frar:ce.

:~

sho1llcl a.c': by the

!f E. D.C. is ratified by

by the end of this mor.th -- and if Italy joins b

T:16!'C is very
rev~al

rati.~.ied

r~so~ut:on.

li.~tle

tlmc left.

T!1c r.ext few

mcn~~1s

-- then

1nay \vcll

whether tl·e Grrmans are t o ·,·ern:1in linked with the hee nn.tions or go their

separate w;.y,

1

wRy whid1, b

a~l

proba1Jility , will lead sooner

o~:

later into the

totalitarian camp .
On the other side of the globe, in Japan, a second dangerous crest is
developing in the international situation.

The causes are not identical with those

in Germany but they are just as serious.
Unlike Germany , Japan has national unity.
has been restored to the Japanese.

Full political sovereignty

They have been permitted to rearm in their

own defense and are now in the process of doing so.
These facto1·s in the situation, however, are dwarfed by the towering
economic problems which confront Japan.

To put these problems bluntly: if

freedom is to survive in Japan and if there is to be peace in eastern Asia , the
Japanese must know with reasonable assurance where the next meal is coming
from.

At the pre sent time, they do not know.
To live as a free , peaceful neighbor in the Pacific, Japan muot

literally fish and trade.

The Japanese have been able to do neither, adequately,

since the end of World War II.

The resultant deficit in their economy

--l4--

has been compensated !or by the United States.
the occupallon .

We provided heavy doles under

More recently, we have made up the defh it largely by

expenditures in Japan incident to the I<orcan conflict and our strategic interests
in the wcotcrn Pacific.
The Japanese must lurn somcwhl!re if they

ar~

not to contil,ne to

depend !or cxislen<.:e on an uncertain charity or tco1por:\l'y p.,llia.tivca li!<c
military procurements which , in any event, arc

l>t~ginni.ng

to shrink .

Tradl..!

outlets in northern Asia and on the ( hinesc mainland, howeve r, arc b l od;:t·d by
Communi .t c.;ontrol of th"'se areas as well as by the
the United Nations.

polide~

of this country and

These are the tradilional avcnucn of Japanese trade .

Effo rts

to develop substitutes for them elsewhere have not yet met with notable success .
A g.Jvcrnmellt of a free uati<.. n cannot expect to rer.w.in long in power,
if it can hold out no hope to its people other than slow starvation or unending

dependence on alien hand-outs .

The Yo::>hida

gov~~1·nrnent

in Japan has been on

the whole cooperative with the United States. It is, hvwcv"r , a Japanc!;e govern ment..

It will either havC' to pursue policies which correspond with the needs

of the Japanese people or it will be replaced.
Japan is now aligned with thP free nations but the aliGnment will
grow more uncertain and tenuous under the pressures of economic r ealities.
Unless concerted steps are taken to meet these
Japanese to turn for survival?

r ~alitics ,

where a rc the

There is no reas on to assu n1e that, as a

sovereign independent nation, they will not turn away from the present alignment.

--15-There is no reason to assume that they will not veer towards Communist China,
towards the Soviet Union or both.
If international communism seeks to sever the ties which presently

hold Japan on the side of freedom, it is not without resources to obtain ·this
objective.

Vast trading inducements can be offered, particularly with respect

to the Soviet Maritime provinces, Manchuria and North China.

There are fish-

ing and other concessions which could he made available in and around Sakhalin
and the Kuriles .

Rice, coal and other resources, desperately needed by Japan,

can come from northern VietNam.
It is entirely possible that the Communists would be inclined to act

with a relatively lavish and open hand if they might expect in return a growing
Japanese neutralism and ultimate incorporation of Japan into their system.
There are measures which can be taken in concert with others which
may forestall the loss of Japan to totalitarianism.

In this connection, the Admin -

istration has recently announced that it is exploring the possibilities of closer
relationships being developed between Japan, Korea and Formosa.

Cther

possibilities may exist for increasing Japan 1 s trade with non-communist nations
particularly in Southeast Asia and in Japanese participation in technical ass5stance programs in the underdeveloped areas.
Japan can be held in the camp of freedom, provided that this country
and other free nations do not ignore the serious predicament in which the
Japanese find themselves; provided we act together and in time to deal with it.

--16-The weeks and months that lie ahead, wee 1ts and months in which
the Senate will stand in recess or adjournment, will be dangerous and difficult
ones .
St~tc

We <J.re entering into a period in which the President and the

S~crctary

of

may be called upon to make major decisions, not only with respect to

C".rmany and Japan but also in connection with other arl!a:J of t:1c world.
I tbink that the President and the Secretary shoul d know that the
Senate is cognizant of the burden

t~'ey

bear in conducting our foreign p Jlicy and

t 11at members of both parties will support them as far as conscience pcrmit!J ,
After the setback at

Gc~ cva ,

a sense of r enewed unity on foreign

policy may be reasserting itself in this country,

Fo r a period, at the tim e of

the tr uce, we were threatened by a wave of partisanship .

Eut the nation may

now be drawing closer together in the face of adversity .
The re is already a framework of agreement shared uy Dct.10Crats
and Republicans nlike on which bipartisan policies can be maintained and
developed.

There is, for example, little party disagreement o n these curren t

courses of action:
l.

No inte rvention by American armed forces in Indochina.

2.

No recognition of Communis t China by the United States
and no admittance of Communist China to the United Nations .

3.

No Locarno pact with the communists for southeast Asia .

4.

The continued need for a European Defense Community.

5.

The granting of soverdgnty to west Germany togethe r
with its right to participate in the defense of Feste rn
Europe .

- - 17 --

Within this framework, we can pursue policies which will build
Cl'eater strength in

t~1e

co - exj::;<; .~~::~ wh~.ch

m<)ans

tc~alitali.::ln

b:cc .

non-communist world -

-::-:.mni<:i~

f~ar

,•way in

We can r.ave mnre

~han

~

r.ot aolcly milita:ry b·.1t moral ,

f:-om every threat o£ a fight,

the futility of a third world war

precipitated by the hotheads among us who by some twisted 1·casoning believe
that the way to stop u war is to act the par.t of the bully and sta1·t one .

We can

have, if we work consistently and without fanfare to build genuine strength ,
the peace we seek, a peace without fear, a peace of stability and of faith
in the

.Lltimate triumph of human freedom.

